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part 2:
Report:
Israeli Palestinians
and the Middle East Peace Process
Other
activities include summer camps for pre-college youths.
One called
"Continuation Without Borders" brings together some 200
eleven to fifteen year old boys and girls from Israel and the West
Bank. Its objective is develop Palestinian consciousness through
exchanging visits among relatives in neighboring countries, visiting
refugee camps, sites of destroyed villages, and the study of Palestinian
history. Groups within the summer camps are organized with names
of refugee camps and destroyed villages. One summer camp is devoted
to teaching some 400 kindergarten and elementary students computer
skills - each camper works for several hours a day on a computer.
A university based camp for pre-college youth, twelve to sixteen
years old, is devoted to science and technology. For ten days fifty
of them attend courses at Haifa University and the Haifa Technical
University (Technion) in preparation for college in a kind of Outward
Bound program.
Jaffar
is also active in Mossawa, the Advocacy Center for Palestinian Equality
in Israel, one of the several organizations devoted to attaining
equal rights for the minority. Mossawa, affiliated with Shatil founded
by the New Israel Fund, attempts to end discriminatory legislation,
to amend unfair existing legislation, and to introduce new laws
furthering equality. It prepares legal briefs and draft legislation
for distribution among Knesset members. Legislative work includes
efforts to repeal land laws unfavorable to Arab villages; Mossawa
also seeks to include Arab villages in government designated priority
regions that receive extra budgetary allocations for development.
During the Rabin era some Arab villages were included in these priority
areas receiving additional funds for education and housing but this
assistance has been cut since Netanyahu became prime minister.
Jaffar
observes that all too often budget allocations for education or
social welfare are tied to political manipulations and determined
by Israeli party politics. Some Zionist parties attempt to influence
Arab voters through grants to communities and appointment of Arabs
to low level official offices. Mafdal, the National Religious Party,
which has frequently controlled the Ministry of Education often
received Arab votes because the party oversaw appointment of teachers,
principals and school inspectors. In the 1996 election Shas, the
party of orthodox Sephardim, received nearly enough Arab votes for
one Knesset seat because its control of the Ministry of Interior
placed it in a position to influence housing allocations and to
overlook illegal construction.
Jaffar
observes that Palestinian frustration in dealing with the Israeli
authorities takes diverse forms. Some react with strengthened self
confidence and increased political and/or social activism; others
withdraw totally from politics and community politics, seeking to
advance their own personal interests. One indication of this frustration
is the increasing emigration of the country's Christian Arabs. So
many young Christian Arab men have left Haifa, he asserts, that
over a third of the city's Christian women under the age of 35 have
been unable to find husbands.
Arab
Education and Culture
One of
the key NGOs in Palestinian efforts to raise standards and to achieve
equal status with the Jewish community is the Follow Up Committee
on Arab Education headed by Dr. Hala Hazzan. The Committee has compiled
data on the status of Arab education and devised a program to improve
it
Arab
and Jewish education in Israel is segregated into separate systems
according to the 1953 state education law that emphasizes "the
values of Jewish culture ...love of the homeland and loyalty to
the state and the Jewish people ...striving for a society built
on freedom, equality, tolerance, mutual assistance and love of mankind."
In
line with these objectives the current Likud government's guidelines
state that: "Education will be grounded in the eternal values
of the Jewish tradition, Zionist and Jewish consciousness and universal
values...the Bible, the Hebrew language, and history are the foundation
stones of our national identity..." There is no mention of
the interests of the Arab community in these pronouncements. Although
the education law states that in non-Jewish educational institutions
curriculum will be adapted to special conditions, no Arab body is
involved in decision making for Arab school curriculum. Arab students
spend more time studying the Torah than Christian, Muslim, or Druse
religious texts; they are examined on Judaism in matriculation exams.
Zionist literature is assigned reading, not Arab Palestinian classics.
Study of Hebrew is compulsory in Arab elementary schools although
Jewish students are not required to study Arabic. Attempts to achieve
a more equitable balance reflecting the modern history and culture
of the Arab people have been rejected when presented to the Knesset.
The recommendations of both government and non-government commissions
established to examine the problems of Arab education have been
largely ignored.
There
is great disparity in the resources allocated to the Arab and Jewish
education systems. Arab schools have far fewer facilities, higher
drop-out rates, more crowded class rooms, and little access to special
services and quality programs. In 1996 when the education ministry
established an "Educational Values Bureau" to promote
Zionist and religious values, only 1 percent of the Bureau's budget
was allocated to Arab schools.
Overcrowded
Arab schools are the norm; inferior buildings and insufficient facilities
are common. There is a shortage of classrooms and rooms for counselors
and nurses, a lack of gymnasiums, libraries, and laboratories. There
are no government funded pre-schools in Arab towns and villages;
where they exist they are in private homes.
One
consequence of these disparities is that in 1996 only 23 percent
of Arab students passed the Bagrut examination required for entrance
to university, compared to 45 percent of Jewish students. Among
Beduin students from the Negev only 5.9 percent succeeded. The lower
level of preparation for higher education results in the relatively
small percent of Arab students in Israeli universities (5.3 percent
Arab; 94.7 percent Jewish in 1992-93).
Closely
related to problems resulting from disparities in Arab and Jewish
education are issues related to differences between Arab and Jewish
culture largely derived from Israel's identity as a Jewish state.
While the vast majority of Jews accept Israel's Zionist foundation,
to most Arabs Zionism is an alien if not a hostile ideology. Although
Palestinian Arabs are the country's indigenous population, Zionist
ideology imported from Europe has become hegemonic and dominates.
The institutions, official holidays, symbols, and heroes are Zionist-Jewish,
to the almost total exclusion of Arab-Palestinian cultural symbols
and icons.
Of
what significance to me is the blue and white flag of Israel, asks
Hala Hazzan's sister, Nabila Espanioli. The flag, a combination
of Jewish religious and Zionist nationalist symbols was the banner
of the First Zionist Congress in 1898. It was inspired by the Jewish
prayer shawl and the symbolic shield of David. The state emblem,
inspired by Jewish religious history, is a candelabra of the ancient
Jewish temple. All public institutions, including Arab schools and
local councils must raise the flag and imprint the symbol on official
documents. Arab citizens have no recognized official national symbols,
but are required to pay homage to those of the state.
Official
state holidays include all Jewish religious holy days such as Rosh
Hashanah (Jewish new year), Yom Kippur (day of atonement) and Passover.
The only other official state holiday is Israel's Independence Day.
Unofficial celebrations commemorate events such as the "reunification"
of Jerusalem. However Muslims, Christians and Druse may chose the
day of rest in their work place. No provision is made for other
than Jewish religious holidays, thus often classes are held and
exams given on days that might include Christmas, Easter, or Ramadan.
Although
Arabic is one of Israel's two official languages (English is widely
used and has become accepted as the country's second language) Arabic
is marginalized. Laws are enacted, regulations passed, and court
decisions given only in Hebrew, usually without Arabic translation.
While the courts have upheld the use of Arabic in the name of free
speech, they have not ruled on its status as one of the official
languages. The 1952 Citizenship Law requires a candidate for Israeli
citizenship to have "some knowledge of Hebrew," but no
recognition is given to Arabic. The Israeli Bar Association requires
lawyers to have knowledge of Hebrew, but it does not recognize Arabic.
Most road signs in Israel are posted in Hebrew and English; only
in heavily populated Arab regions do they include Arabic. A case
to remedy this oversight is now pending before the Supreme Court.
Although
one in five Israeli citizens is Arab, few Jewish citizens select
study of Arabic as a second language. A recent survey of 386 Jewish
Israelis found that the group overwhelmingly perceived the Arabic
language as "unimportant and not valuable." Only two of
those surveyed expressed a desire to learn Arabic, and then as a
third rather than a second language.
Little
attention is given to Arab culture and history on Israeli radio
and TV, thus most children, Arab and Jewish, fail to absorb through
the media a positive image of the minority's role in developing
the country's identity. All these factors - the lack of attention
to Arab culture and history in the education system, the secondary
role of Arabic as an official language, and the near omission of
positive aspects of minority life in the media - create a negative
impression among Jewish youth and ambivalence or confusion about
their identity among young Arabs.
Training
Palestinian Social Scientists
The Galilee
Center for Social Research headed by Dr. Khalil Rinawi was established
in 1988 to apply critical research and scholarship in surveys of
issues affecting Israel's Arab minority. A principal objective is
to train a cadre, even a community of Israeli Arab scholars to confront
these issues with scientific objectivity and to seek ways of coping
with the minority's problems. All too often, Dr. Rinawi maintains,
the community has depended on research conducted by Jewish scholars
or Palestinians trained by them. The minority would be better served
if these issues were perceived through Arab eyes rather than through
the lenses of Israeli (i.e. Jewish) professors. Dr. Rinawi believes
that studies of the minority by Arabs tutored by Jewish professors
often reflects "paternalism and cultural hegemony." Among
the country's Jewish academicians only Professors Ilan Pappe and
Shlomo Sharansky are free from cultural bias and paternalism, Rinawi
asserts. Nevertheless the Galilee Center has undertaken several
joint projects with the Haifa and Hebrew Universities. Dr. Rinawi
even teaches a course at Bar Ilan, the university run by orthodox
Jews.
The
Center's projects include applied research on education in collaboration
with the Ministry of Education; together they have attempted to
develop a new curriculum for Israel's Arab schools. One phase of
the project was to produce a history of the Arab-Jewish conflict
for Arab schools. After much discussion and many arguments, a compromise
was reached to present both Arab and Jewish views of the conflict
in a single textbook. Another project was to develop a three volume
series dealing with the state and citizenship in the Middle East
emphasizing the status of democracy in Palestine and Israel. To-date
these projects have developed in joint committees but have yet to
be approved by ministry officials.
Rinawi
observes that since Oslo officials in the Ministry of Education
have a new attitude. During the previous forty five years mention
of Palestine or Arab nationalism was banned. However since 1992-3
the government seems to have recognized the existence of the Palestinians
and their history as valid subjects for discussion in the country's
Arab school system.
An
unrealized goal of the Center is to establish an Arab university
in Israel, a project suggested for years but that the government
has until now rejected. A step in this direction is establishment
of a two year institution where Dr. Rinawi is dean, Mar Elias College
in the town of Iblin. When asked, why not a bi-national university
rather than an Arab one, Rinawi stated that before such an approach
his community must establish its own credibility as a point of departure
toward bi-nationalism. In the present situation the Arab community
is much weaker and unprepared to achieve a symmetrical relationship
with the Jewish majority. Until this asymmetry is remedied, bi-nationalism
would be inappropriate.
Dr.
Rinawi maintains that the peace process has marginalized Israeli
Arabs and to-date has been irrelevant to their needs. While politically
he favors the peace process, analytically he perceives a situation
in which Israel, after giving up Gaza and parts of the West Bank,
will say to the Palestinians, now you have your own state and we
have ours which must remain purely Jewish; Palestinians must chose
between living under apartheid or leaving.
Local
Government
The Galilee
Center also has examined the problems of some 140 Arab government
units including local and regional councils and eight municipalities.
Elections, held every five years, are often bitterly fought among
diverse Palestinian political movements, hamulas and family factions;
results at the local level do not necessarily reflect or correspond
to results in national elections but may indicate the future course
of Arab political trends. Significant trends now include the Islamic
Movement, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (largely Rakkah),
and Azmi Bishara's nationalist faction which calls for social and
cultural autonomy. Many in his constituency, like Bishara himself,
are former members of Rakkah, Ibna Balad (Sons of the Village) or
individual activists.
Local
elections and governments are supervised by the Ministry of Interior
which Rinawi asserts, seeks to "domesticate" the minority.
The councils and municipalities are responsible for sanitation,
education, local administration and other local affairs. Police
functions are the responsibility of the central rather then the
local authorities. Village level elections often reflect internal
tensions among hamulas and at times between Muslims and Christians,
on occasion erupting in violence. A recent example was a dispute
in Turan where fighting broke out between Muslims and Christians
when one group accused the other of betraying the national interest
by selling land to Jews. One result of these tensions according
to Rinawi, has been realization by Christians of their weakness
vis-a-vis the community and increased emigration, frequently to
North America.
A
negative trend is a counter nationalist emphasis expressed through
individualism which Rinawi terms "privatism;" members
of the community look inward - toward the family, the hamula, or
their religious group rather than to the national unit. Since Oslo,
he asserts, many Israeli Arabs have become disillusioned at their
lack of participation in the process and have withdrawn to individualism.
Two opposing trends are evident - increasing separation and segregation
of Palestinians versus attempts to "Americanize," a trend
Rinawi calls 'McDonaldization."
Local
councils have three principal sources of funding - a direct fixed
allocation from the Ministry of Interior, an indirect or development
budget, and assistance from NGOs. In fixed budgets there is a ratio
of 3 to 1 favoring Jewish local governments. The ratio in development
funding is six or seven to one. Jewish local governments also receive
large amounts of funding from sources not available to Palestinians,
through the Jewish Agency, Project Renewal and the like. Jewish
towns are often supported by the government which locates new factories
or business establishments within their jurisdiction.
Land
confiscation and resulting shortages are a major source of conflict
between Arab villages and neighboring Jewish settlements. Tensions
have been created when land taken from the villages is turned over
to Jewish neighbors. These disputes are reflected in the great differences
between development plans for Jewish and Arab communities that give
primary consideration to Jewish needs with Arab requirements receiving
secondary, if any consideration. When Arab city planners reserve
space to provide much needed housing and the necessary infrastructure,
government officials often veto their plans. Arab plans for village
development are frequently rejected for "security reasons;"
one charge is that Palestinian acquisition of hill tops presents
a threat. In one instance a plan to use village lands for housing
was rejected because government planners projected use of the area
for a national park that the villagers suspected would later be
used for Jewish housing.
The
problems of Shfar'am, one of the largest Arab towns in Israel, are
typical. In the last half century its population has more than doubled,
to over 30,000. Although relatively small, Shfar'am is a center
of several recently formed NGOs and political groups. The headquarters
of the Committee of Palestinian Local Councils, Mayors, and Knesset
members is located there. When AFSC workers became acquainted with
the town 50 years ago, it was a traditional agricultural village
lacking medical, social welfare and water facilities. Today it is
a bustling commercial center with paved streets, small industries
and a modern town hall.
The
Mayor, Ibrahim Nimr Hussein, also known as Abu Hattem, was first
elected as an independent in 1969 and has remained in office ever
since. His election resulted from upheaval caused by dissatisfaction
with municipal conditions - sewage, water supply, etc. A series
of articles in Israel's leading newspaper, Haaretz , by Atallah
Mansour brought attention to conditions and led to construction
of a sewer system.
As
so many other Arab towns, Shfar'am is far from self sufficient today.
Few farmers remain; only about 15 percent live from agriculture.
Most of the 140,000 dunams the locals once owned have been expropriated
leaving only 25,000 dunams. Now the town is totally dependent on
the Jewish economy. Most inhabitants are employed in the diverse
Jewish industries in the neighboring Krayot, the industrial outposts
of Haifa.
One
of the Krayot, Kriyat Ata, a town of approximately the same size
as Shfar'am is its nearest Jewish neighbor. The two share some services
such as the large water purification system. Both receive funds
from the Ministry of Interior with a ratio of two to one in favor
of Kiriyat Ata. In addition to operating funds from the ministry,
both towns receive special allocations for development projects
including roads, school improvement, and other municipal works.
Under the current government Shfar'am receives only half as much
assistance as allocated during the Rabin era. The financial situation
of Shfar'am, like that of 43 of the 58 Arab local governments, is
perilous - many have been unable to pay their municipal employees'
salaries for several months because of budget shortages. A major
difference between many of the Arab and Jewish towns is that the
latter have a much larger tax base and thus are able to raise funds
locally whereas in a town like Shfar'am 40 percent of the inhabitants
have inadequate resources and therefore do not pay taxes. A large
percentage of Arab inhabitants are exempt from taxes or can make
only minimal payments because of low incomes, senior citizen exemptions,
or large families thus the tax base in Arab towns is considerably
less than in Jewish towns of equal size. Sami Gerasi's 1972 village
survey showed that Jewish local governments received up to twenty
times the assistance received by Arab municipalities of the same
size. That disparity has been reduced, according to Mayor Hussein,
so that the ratio is now only about two to one.
When
asked why he believed these disparities exist, the mayor replied:
"Because we are Arabs and they are Jews!" He is pessimistic
about achieving equality, even if there is a peace settlement. Although
Israel's Arabs understand both sides in the conflict, they have
neither been invited nor permitted to play a role in the peace process.
Before
the 1993 Oslo agreement, Mayor Hussein was invited by the PLO to
visit its headquarters in Tunis arriving during the 1991 Madrid
negotiations. He explained to Arafat, Kadumi, and other PLO officials
that the time was appropriate to push for a peace settlement because,
he believed, the Rabin government would be receptive. However, he
warned Arafat, the Palestinians could not expect to realize all
their demands. At the time the government included Meretz, and was
also supported by Arab Knesset members. With the present government,
Nimr Hussein feels there is little if any possibility of achieving
a settlement.
Women
Activists
A cadre
of dynamic women is playing an increasingly important role in the
new thinking of the younger generation of Israeli Arab leaders.
At least half a dozen of the NGOs affiliated with Ittijah focus
on the rights and the problems of families, and many women are leaders
in groups working on other community problems. Aida Suleiman, director
and a founder of Women Against Violence, was a student activist
at Haifa University where she studied psychology and Arab literature.
As
one of the first activities, Women Against Violence established
a hot line for women in trouble to seek help. Callers can now receive
assistance and/or advice on dealing with family violence, how to
obtain a divorce, and similar problems. Information about the organization
is available through posters and leaflets distributed at prominent
places in towns and villages. The organization also sponsors lectures
on what is referred to as "family issues," a euphemism
for marital discord, wife battering, psychological counseling, and
legal referrals. It runs the Arab community's only battered women's
shelter and a half-way home.
The
group also lobbies for woman's rights through the courts and via
Knesset legislation. A recent project urges the Knesset to pass
legislation granting Muslim women access to the civil courts in
family cases that until now have been the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Islamic religious courts.
Suleiman
observed that in many issues related to the status of women there
is an unofficial alliance between the Islamic movement and Shas,
the party of orthodox Sephardi Jews. She, as many others, believes
that the government takes a "hands-off" position on social
issues related to the Palestinian community. They charge that Israeli
police seldom if ever intervene in Arab family disputes; that they
fail to arrest drug dealers as long as they keep their activity
within the Palestinian community. Observers point out that Akko
has become one of the country's main centers for drug dealing but
that the government has so far failed to take action against the
culprits.
Another
woman activist, Suhad Assad, director of Nazareth's Family Peace
Center, observes that one of the chief causes of family violence
has been trauma experienced as the community is transformed from
a traditional Middle Eastern to a modern Western society. Family
violence, she maintains, is not unrelated to the land problem; housing
shortages responsible for crowded living conditions often create
increased tension.
The
idealized image of the extended family living harmoniously in a
single large household is often misleading. These conditions frequently
result in inter-generational squabbles, a struggle for hegemony,
and a breakdown of the traditional patriarchal family mores. Suhad
Assad vision of the effects of a peace settlement is truly optimistic:
with peace, she asserts, economic conditions will improve and more
funds will be available for child services, education and improved
housing. "If peace comes, everyone will have their rights."
Today's unstable environment, she maintains, is responsible for
the crisis of values in the younger generation, victims of economic
and cultural disorder.
Israel's
Identity Crisis
The crisis
of values is exacerbated by the continuing ambiguity about the status
of Israel's Arab citizens and their role in a Jewish or Zionist
state. Although one in five citizens is Arab, few Israeli Jews are
aware of what the lives of their non-Jewish fellow citizens are
like or empathize with the problems and dilemmas confronting them.
Conversations with new immigrants from the former Soviet Union,
now the largest single ethnic group in the country, reveal that
few had any acquaintance with the Palestinian minority. Some commented
that "our Arabs" [Israelis] are different that those across
the borders, but even with "ours" one can't be too careful!
Ironically, often it seems that new immigrants regard the indigenous
Arab population as intruders in the Jewish homeland. So far the
minority's organized attempts to be treated with dignity and to
achieve equality in social and economic opportunities are often
perceived by the majority as a threat to the Jewish state and to
the security of its Jewish citizens. These perceptions were evident
in a recent press report that aroused apprehension in the Arab community.
It alleged that an official report regarded Israeli Arabs as a "potential
security threat." The allegation was supposed to have emerged
from a series of meetings by security officials and "experts"
on Israeli Arab affairs. Although the government denied the existence
of these recommendations, their appearance in the press was a manifestation
of the tensions between the government and its Arab minority. According
to Israeli informed sources, some security officials have warned
of growing disaffection within the Israeli Arab community and advised
the government of the necessity to implement laws that promise equal
treatment of all citizens.
Mutual
distrust is reinforced by the government's perception of the Palestinian
majority in Galilee as a threat to the state's security and the
continuing policies of "Judaizing" the region. Tensions
between the government and the Arab minority were intensified during
the 1970s by the first Land Day demonstration that erupted in violence
and the "Koenig document," a series of proposals by the
Northern District Commissioner at the time calling for greater control
of and restrictions on the Arab minority. The proposals were never
approved as official policy, but many were unofficially accepted.
The "Judaization" process gathered momentum after 1975
with expropriation of additional thousands of dunams turned over
to dozens of new Jewish settlements and demolition of illegal Arab
housing outside the zones approved for construction.
Among
the few efforts to diminish these tensions is the work of Shemesh,
The Organization for Jewish-Arab Friendship and Coexistence in the
Galilee. The program began when Arabs in Shaab established contact
with Jewish settlers in newly established Shorashim. According to
Harry Rhodes, one of the founders of Shemesh, when the settlers
arrived, villagers from Shaab crossed the valley separating the
two settlements to welcome the new Jewish arrivals. The initial
fear each had of the other was dissipated as they began to cooperate
in a variety of projects including a camp for Jewish and Arab youth.
This year Shemesh initiated a Jewish-Arab Bilingual Regional school
beginning with a first grade class that included 32 children from
the Jewish Misgav region and from Arab Sachnin and Shaab. The school
is expected to progress by adding one class per year. Now the school
is situated on the Misgav campus, but in the long run it plans to
have its own site on neutral ground between Jewish and Arab settlements.
The
Wolfson Jewish-Arab Neighborhood Association and the Sir Charles
Clore Jewish-Arab Community Center are efforts to bridge the gap
between Jews and Arabs in Akko, one of Israel's three or four mixed
towns. The neighborhood association was established after the municipality
moved some Arabs from the Old City to the Wolfson housing block
in new Akko. A major objective was to overcome the stigma that "mixed"
neighborhoods were undesirable. The Jewish-Arab Community Center
adjoins Wolfson but provides social action and cultural programs
for all residents of Akko. To-date both efforts have been successful
although intrinsic problems remain like those created by Arab and
Jewish children educated in entirely different school systems.
Experiments
like those in Akko and Shorashim-Shaab are still peripheral. Most
Jewish and Arab communities are largely self contained with few
social contacts between them. Among Arabs there is growing preference
for building autonomous institutions rather than cooperating with
like-minded Jewish agencies, a tendency reinforced by a new Palestinian
consciousness. And in the Jewish community the emphasis is on strengthening
Israel's Jewish identity and its Zionist character, a trend that
overlooks the fact that a fifth of the population is neither Jewish
nor Zionist. Even a group like Peace Now has no Arabs among its
prominent members, because, one of its leaders explained, Peace
Now is a Zionist organization.
In
spite of the government's declarations that official education and
media aim at preserving and developing the country's multi-culture
character, this objective seems to be irreconcilable with the initial
and consistently practiced determination to build a state for the
Jews and Jews alone. Full integration of Israel's Arab-Palestinian
minority cannot be expected while the national ethos is exclusively
Jewish and Zionist. However it is reasonable to support efforts,
peripheral as they are, that seek to build coalitions between Jews
and Arabs striving for social and economic betterment, groups like
those in Akko and Shorashim-Shaab.
Don
& Maya Peretz
October
1998
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